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THE TWO BACONS.
BY ERNST DUHRING.'
IN contrast to the standpoint of scholasticism the figure of Roger
Bacon comes before vis as a surprise. In a century of darkness it
bears the clear and luminous features of later times, but on account
of this very circumstance it failed at first to produce any definite
demonstrable efifect. It has been rightly said of Roger Bacon that
he has been unwarrantably thrown in the shade in favor of his
less worthy namesake. Sir Francis Bacon, who stands upon the
threshold of the modern era. It is also said with equal justice that
the earlier Bacon's energy and judgments in the line of experimental
research greatly exceeded those of the author of the Novum or-
ganon, and that it was only the ill favor of time, which he far out-
ran, that permitted his courage to remain for a while without any
efifect.
A British monk of the thirteenth century who specialized in the
study of mathematics, mechanics and other natural science, as far
as these could be acquired from good sources, namely from Arabic
and Greek writings, and, unsatisfied with what he was able to learn
in this way, applied himself to the best possible source, nature, was
indeed an anachronism. He was the greater anachronism that he
did not stop at mere recommendations of the empirical method like
the Bacon of the sixteenth century, but actually obtained results,
among which the best known are his discoveries in the realm of
optics. His Opus majus ("Greater Work") contains treatises
which ofifer better material then the Chancellor—who, by the way,
paraded with more than merely his predecessor's name—was able
to ofifer three centuries later. Moreover history need hardly add
what can confidently be assumed from common experience and
^Translated by Lydia'G. Robinson from the author's Kritische Geschichte
der Philosophie. Dr. Diiliring is known for his clearsighted views and his
trenchant style, bringing out weak points to the very limit of fairness.—Ed.
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intrinsic necessity, namely that Roger Bacon was the victim of
the worst possible persecutions, and even in his last years was
compelled to undergo a ten year imprisonment. It is not even
known positively whether he was freed from prison a short time
before his death, which took place about in his seventy-eighth
year (1292), or whether he died in prison.
As we have already said, Roger Bacon was not able to bring
about all at once a revolution in what to him was most important
of all, but in a negative way he succeeded in undermining scholasti-
cism to a considerable extent apparently even in the eyes of his
contemporaries, and at the same time directed a blow against the
wavering structure which provided an important precedent for its
later collapse.
Roger Bacon had studied and investigated for twenty years
before he wrote down his now famous extensive works. That he
wrote them down at all was due to an external inducement, namely
a commission from Pope Clement IV. This order of the year 1266
is the only positive favor fate ever bestowed on this man, who was
annoyed by those immediately above him in position and soon
afterwards directly persecuted by later popes. He had despaired of
ever being able to hand down to posterity the results of his studies
and therefore he seized this opportunity with revived enthusiasm
because it promised his labors a greater consideration from without,
and at the same time, as he was well aware, a secure route to later
generations.
Under the name of the "Greater Work" (Opus majiis) he ar-
ranged in systematic order a number of highly important and com-
prehensive treatises. He began with excursions on the "obstacles
of knowledge," described the inaccessibility of the means of re-
search, and presented all the single results which he had attained
in the realm of the various special sciences. Reforms in theoretical
and practical optics, as well as in chronology and the calendar,
played a leading part in his investigations. Besides the Opus majus
he composed at the same time a "Smaller Work" (Opus minus)
and a "Third Work" (Opus tertium) by means of which he intended
partly to promote the clearness of the greater work and partly to
fill up gaps in it. Much that he left out in the first place and only
succeeded in formulating properly during the progress of the newer
work was in this way included in the two later writings.
Until 1859 only the Opus majus was accessible in print, but
in that year the manuscripts of the two othet" works were edited in
the official collection of writings important for the medieval history
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of England (Roger! Bacon opera quaedam hactenus inedita edited by
J. S. Brewer, London, 1859). For a view of the author himself
the Opus tertiiim, contained in the first volume of this edition,
ought to be the first considered, since the Opus minus can not be
regarded as authoritative because the manuscript upon which it is
based has been greatly corrupted by the copyist. All three writings
were begun and completed within less than a year and a half
(1266-1267), a fact which if it were not positively confirmed in
many quarters would surely be doubted by all who can not con-
ceive how the preparation of an entire life must indeed have enabled
a man of Roger Bacon's caliber to present with great rapidity the
range of his thought and the substance of his knowledge.
This phase of his achievements is certainly conclusive evidence
of his power, and indeed the more so since one who had studied
and reflected so long without putting his thoughts on paper can not
be suspected of any inordinate love of writing. To him the thing
of greatest importance was to obtain a particular knowledge pecu-
liarly his own, and he did not apply himself to authorship until
he could have before his eyes with good reason the prospeci: of an
actual medium of communication.
He exhausted his money in the pursuit of his studies, and, as
he himself relates in the Opus tertium, spent two thousand pounds
—an enormous sum for that day—on instruments, books, tables and
apparatus. Such scientific conduct was indeed an anomaly in those
days. One might obtain wisdom with less trouble and money if
he would move in circles of scholastic argument, or, what would
be really worse, tuned the strings of emotion to mysticism and
wound them a little too tight.
Roger Bacon occupies an isolated position, but he is the only
one in the middle ages who deserves the name of philosopher. The
fact that in the year 1267, almost six and a half centuries ago, a
Franciscan monk at Oxford was able in from fifteen to eighteen
months to outline in three simultaneous works a comprehensive
picture of the scientific defects of his day. of the needs for an actual
reform, and of his contemplations and knowledge which were far
in advance of his time, and in this work to betray a power and
scope of mind to which every age can point with satisfaction—this
isolated fact we must regard as a signpost to the modern era, and
is alone suited to represent criticism of the middle ages on its own
ground. No nominalism ever reached so far as the actual craving
for knowledge of this indefatigable student and thinker. In lan-
guage not overburdened with imagery, like that of the second
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Bacon, but the simplest which most naturally belongs to interest
in a definite purpose, Roger Bacon developed in his three mutually
explanatory works the opinions and knowledge which he regarded
as the preliminary conditions of a scientific reform and offered as
the fruits of his twenty years of study.
Bacon rightly appreciated the contrast between realism and
nominalism since he perceived that there was only a difference of
terms in this most celebrated point of controversy in the so-called
philosophy of the middle ages. In general he treated with the most
decided contempt the logic in use which in his time formed the
pride of scholasticism. He regarded it as absolutely barren. On
the other hand he never tired of recommending mathematics as the
basis of all positive knowledge, and as the true organon of knowl-
edge. In this respect he hit exactly upon a truth which even after
three more centuries the second Bacon missed altogether.
We can not here discuss in detail the discoveries and theories of
natural science, especially in optics, at which Roger Bacon arrived
by his own application of those principles which he recommended
to the rest of the world as the correct method. The way in which
he conceived the transmission of light in different substances, and
especially the general theories on the communication and mode of
operation of natural forces in space which he perfected bear witness
even to-day to the depth and keenness of his intellect and in many
directions yet untried offer better stimulus to investigation and
thought than all the speculative, or rather fantastic, so-called nature
philosophy of Schelling, Hegel, and others of their kind. Roger
Bacon evidently possessed in almost equal measure the faculty for
observation and experiment on the one hand, and for deductive
thought on the other. Nor did he by any means ignore the thought
of the past for the sake of an exclusive observation of nature, but
by means of a fundamental use of classical literature laid down
the program of the revival of a better knowledge which was actu-
ally carried out afterwards in the course of history.
The languages were to him next in importance to mathematics
as means for obtaining knowledge, and he entertained the highest
hopes of replacing, if possible, by an adequate understanding of
the original works the bad translations whose worthlessness he
depicts in interesting detail. He had long applied himself to the
attainment of a number of languages and to the construction of
their grammar. His use of Aristotle's Physics, which in his day
became accessible for the first time, proves among many other
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things that he not merely had recommended the study and under-
standing of the sources in their purest form as the means of sal-
vation from medieval ignorance and superficiality, but had himself
first made use of all the means at his disposal.
The view that has been praised in recent times as a high
degree of philological wisdom, namely, that the corrupted texts
and worthless translations of the middle ages had prevented the
world from obtaining proper profit from the ancient traditions,
and especially from Aristotle, has perhaps never been represented
with such zeal as by Roger Bacon himself for whom an opinion
of this kind was well founded. For since he observed how many
superficialities in the thought of his time could be removed merely
by obtaining the proper meaning from ancient authors, especially
from Aristotle, he was not wrong in expecting important elucida-
tions from the better philological treatment of the scientific litera-
ture of the past.
On the other hand he must have discovered from his own ex-
perience and proved by his own example how comparatively poorly
a better understanding of Aristotle would succeed in scattering
the scholastic mists. Indeed. Roger Bacon's attitude towards Aris-
totle furnishes a silent and unconscious critique of the position of
the entire middle ages with regard to the Stagirite.
In spite of his ready recognition of the esteem which Aris-
totle enjoyed, yea, even in spite of positive efforts to gain something
useful from that author's writings on the philosophy of nature, still
Roger Bacon had not the slightest hesitation to theorize with entire
freedom according to his own observations and experiments and
to bring counter evidence against the principal fundamental ideas
of Aristotle. There was no question of a real authority, in the
meaning of the word then current, and the rejection of syllogistic
logic as an entirely superfluous framework for the attainment of
knowledge also bore witness to but a slight dependence on Aris-
totle.
The reason for this free and independent attitude was the
circumstance that the same force dominated Roger Bacon which
later became the firmest support of modern scholarship and even
to-day provides the most certain guarantee of the triumph over
the last medieval mode of thought. The spirit of scientific research,
yes in a certain sense even a scientific mode of thought, formed a
nucleus for the endeavor of that Bacon of the thirteenth century,
and it was only because of this that he was able with few exceptions
to tower above the prejudices of his time, to become a true critic
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of its principal shortcomings, and to prophesy correctly the means
by which the future would triumph over the prevailing ignorance.
The modern revival of the scientific spirit has indeed advanced
along the two highways whereon Roger Bacon had done everything
for himself and had attained all that could possibly be hoped for
from the strength of one genius relying solely upon himself.
THE SECOND BACON.
It was once a universally accepted view, although it is now
strongly contested in the circles of natural science, that Lord Bacon
of Verulam was the pioneer in modern scientific method and natural
science. Since he was at the head of English philosophy and a
generation earlier than Descartes—who on the continent is usually
placed beside him—he was even regarded as the founder of mod-
ern philosophy. Fortunately, however, even before it was actually
rejected, this view was moderated by a contradictory claim in its
consequences. Although the questionable role of Bacon remained
uncontested until very recently, yet speculative philosophers who
did not favor empirical knowledge clung firmly to the view that
Descartes was the founder of their method, and from this point
of view they chose to represent him as the father of modern philos-
ophy, so to speak. On this point authorities were divided and the
notion became generally current, and is still held in many quar-
ters, that Bacon was to be looked upon as the originator of modern
empiricism and Descartes as the first representative of the modern
style of speculative philosophy. Historians decided according to
their own preferences for the one or the other line of thought,
which of the two men should be regarded as beginning the modern
era. The difference of a generation by which Bacon preceded
his continental rival might indeed strengthen the claims of
.
his
own adherents but was not great enough to prevent the policy of
the opponents of this standpoint.
From the standpoint of present-day criticism Bacon must be
regarded as having inspired an increase of useful knowledge and a
kind of research directed towards the rougher part of natural
science. In this connection the Briton has brought to definite ex-
pression the specifically English tendency to the hard and tangible,
and in this respect he forms the most pronounced contrast to the
nature of the criticism which later grew up also on British ground,
but which, as may well be taken into account, appears in its finest
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results as the fruit of the Scottish aud not the specifically English
intellect.
Francis Bacon of London (1561-1626) was a younger son and
hence was obliged to make up in a career what he lacked in inheri-
tance. In fact after a juridical preparation he finally brought it
about by the ruthless pursuit of his purpose that he was made
Keeper of the Great Seal and Lord Chancellor. Of more service
to him than his birth, which was in the same rank, or than the
circumstance that his father had been Keeper of the Great Seal
before him, was the passion with which he himself pursued these
offices and the money connected with them. He had to contend
against great obstacles, and his successes did not begin until James I
ascended the throne, but after that they increased with extra-
ordinary rapidity and finally changed to an abrupt fall from the
greatest height which left him no recourse but to spend five years
in scientific leisure.
He entered Trinity College, Cambridge, at the age of thirteen.
After studying three and a half years he accompanied the ambassa-
dor Paulet to France to get some training in afifairs. The death
of his father in 1580 obliged him to return. Then, when about
twenty years of age, he applied to the government to furnish him
with resources in the form of a definite capital, that he might be
able to devote himself undisturbed to literature and politics. The
failure of his suit obliged him to enter upon the practice of law,
and he is said to have been not altogether unsuccessful as an
attorney. What most prevented him from rising in his profession
seems to have been the disfavor of Burleigh, whereas the Earl of
Essex advanced his cause in the friendliest way and took his side
at every opportunity. He gave him material support and even
presented him with an estate. Bacon later rewarded all these bene-
fits in a very singular and dubious fashion. When Essex's afifairs
likewise were in a bad way Bacon took an interest in them. Essex
too had previously taken an interest in his. In this particular
everything corresponds exactly. Only there is a certain difiference
which the most well-disposed historians and biographers have not
been able to regard as insignificant, for Bacon had taken such an
interest in the afifairs of his noble and high-minded friend, that
when he saw him in disfavor and in danger he drew up the accusa-
tion against him, performed the services of an attorney in this re-
gard, smoothed the path of the noble man to the scafifold to the
best of his ability, and finally undertook to defame his memory as
an author.
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Those who still try to palliate to some extent Bacon's behavior
on this occasion, cannot bring forward any argument but the fact
that he was naturally good natured and could not have practised
such treachery except from weakness. We do not think that the
color of the blot is changed materially by this means. At all events
that kind of morals which combines a certain sort of good nature
with the ability to treat others in the meanest and lowest way is a
very familiar phenomenon. In the meantime we may well reflect
whether evil which has its origin in power and the will directed
with definite consciousness towards obtaining power, bears any less
contemptible a stamp than an act of selfish baseness resulting from
weakness. The complete contrast in every sense to what is noble
or great in conduct towards man—this contrast in the direct form
of behavior which the people unhesitatingly called infamous has
been determined in Bacon's character for all time, and even the
comparatively favorable way in which a Macauley treats him in
his well-known essay cannot avoid an accusing judgment. All that
can be attempted to save Bacon's name is simply to let the life of
the man withdraw behind his scientific accomplishments.
The dishonor which Bacon morally heaped upon himself by
his behavior towards Essex, but which seemed to have been the
first step towards really dedicating him to the achievements of a
career, was followed, so to speak—though not until late—by an
avenging punishment which was the more grievous to a rougher
temperament. At first, however, the different promotions up to
viscount and the attainment of influential official positions up to
those previously mentioned of keeper of the great seal and lord
chancellor followed rapidly upon each other after 1603. All these
successes are readily accounted for by his unconditional pliancy
towards Buckingham, the flippant and unprincipled favorite who
well knew how to reward his creatures. Nevertheless parliament
took advantage of a favorable opportunity (1621) to give expres-
sion to the universal disapproval of the Lord Chancellor and to
bring about through the Upper House his conviction for many
corrupt practices.
To be sure the sentence was for the most part merely nominal.
The enormous fine of forty thousand pounds was at once remitted
by an act of clemency. His imprisonment in the Tower, to which
he was condemned as long as it should be the king's pleasure, is
said to have lasted two days as a matter of form. Hence all that
continued in effect was the loss of offices and dignity and expulsion
from parliament, and he was also forbidden to appear at court.
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But even in these points he was for the most part gradually re-
instated and was granted a pension. Nevertheless the stroke had
been too heavy, and Bacon made no further attempt to appear
again on the external stage but continued to give as much rein
as possible to his fondness for ostentatious splendor in domestic
affairs.
The corruption in which he had been implicated finds its ex-
planation in his avarice which had been greatly augmented by his
excessive extravagance. His financial affairs were never in order
because, whether he occupied an official position or not, he sought
from the start to keep up a degree of splendor out of all proportion
to his resources not only when his income was meager but even at
the zenith of his prosperity. At any rate there is not the slightest
doubt about his heavy indebtedness, since he himself admitted it
as a matter of course in order to prevent discussion of the single
scandalous details.
He was as boastful in scientific matters (and often very
clumsily so) as he was ostentatious in his domestic affairs. The
pompous title which he gave to his first youthful sketch on the
transformation of knowledge, which according to his own date he
wrote when about twenty-six years of age, looks more like vanity
than pride. He called it "The Greatest Birth of Time" (Temporis
partus maximiis, not mascnlus as the title of one of the essays in
the pubhshed editions reads).
In this respect he ended as he had begun. When ill and con-
scious of his approaching death he declared in a letter that he was
dying as a martyr to science, like Pliny the elder. And yet he had
not in the least exposed himself consciously to a great danger as
Pliny had done, but very accidentally contracted a severe cold
when stuffing a hen with snow in order to discover what effect that
would have in retarding decomposition. Moreover he had already
reached his sixty-sixth year and had had earlier in life a better
oi)portunity to suffer martyrdom for science by very humble actions,
for instance by sacrificing his fondness for luxury and by abandon-
ing the advantages of a more than thankless and corrupt conduct.
Bacon's first publication, which at once established him as an
author, was his Essays (1597). They are popularly written and
contain an excellent philosophy of life, and are read in England
at the present time and continue to be reprinted in new editions.
In the Latin translation made by Bacon himself they bear the title
"Sermons of a Believer" {Sermones fidcles). The treatise on the
dignity and increase of the sciences (1623) had a predecessor in
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the English language (1605) with the title The Advancement of
Learning.
As a rule Bacon seems to have usually worked things out in
English and then translated or provided for a translation by his
friends. On the other hand Cogitata et visa, published as early
as 1612, seems to have been the basis for t\\& Novum organon, the
other main work of the Instauratio magna, which appeared in 1620.
The Novum organon itself is said to have been worked over twelve
times before it appeared. It forms the most important work from
a scientific standpoint, and of all Bacon's writings it is equalled
in general significance and effectiveness only by the above-mentioned
popular Essays.
We need say nothing here of his publications on law and
history. It would be an equally fruitless and tedious waste of
space to undertake, as many do, to go through Bacon's very in-
different encyclopedic classifications and divisions of knowledge,
but we will only indicate the contents and the interconnections of
his main works so far as is necessary.
The ardor, we may as well say the violence, with which Bacon
had entered upon the external tasks of his life, is reflected in the
style and contents of his writings. Even in the realm of logic and
scientific methods his language abounds in figures and expressions
of poetic color and warmth. It would fain enchant, but usually
degenerates into too great an exuberance. It obeys the rein of fancy
and of inflated emotion, even where a moderation of such profusion
is demanded by the nature of the subject.
Perhaps a large part of the influence which Bacon acquired over
the minds of men and especially outside of his own country may be
charged to the fascinating style of his effusions. Nevertheless we
must not overlook the comparatively unnatural affectation of this
manner which puts on the color very thickly and in so far at any
rate corresponds to the crude and clumsy object whose picture is
to be drawn. But this intrinsic harmony between the vain man
and his highest purpose on the one hand and the appearance of his
literary garb on the other must not deceive us with regard to the
discord in which both stand with the nobler type of what is true and
in accordance with nature.
Useful knowledge is to be increased by observation and ex-
periment and thus the power and dignity of mankind will be en-
hanced. The fundamental idea which guides the philosopher in
this respect is in fact the same as that with which the British nation
has been imbued up to the present day. It is an idea which arises
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quite automatically whenever material considerations are dominant
and is never lacking where the force and magnitude of external
life preserve the balance over all other interests by means of cul-
tural relations. In the face of this principle, the scientific method
is not the thing of first importance, but merely a consequence of the
main factor. The technical and practical triumph is the end in
view, and man's impulse to increase his power over nature and his
fellow beings is the motive cause.
This explains both facts and theories. It is the pivot around
which Bacon's imagination constantly turned. In life he strove
after power for himself and practised the arts by which the higher
offices could be procured. In science he felt obliged to preach to
the human race a similar line of conduct, namely to follow the
grossest means of research with absolute disregard of all the nobler
motives for acquiring knowledge. He cared nothing for relations
with more ideal interests. He assumed that men would have to
waive the incontestable consciousness of intellectual supremacy in
favor of the material extension of power. He gave little heed to
all the ideas about life and the universe, or rather in his opinion
they shrivelled up into an arena for the great art of the "useful,"
in the coarser sense of the word.
When we read his vigorous aphorisms and comprehend his
expressions on the lamentable condition of his time we may deceive
ourselves for a moment with regard to their true meaning and
scope. All knowledge, he says derisively, rested hitherto on about
six brainlets (in sc.v hominum cerehellis). The only hope, we read
in one of his best known utterances, is to be placed in true induc-
tion. Who to-day would not fully agree with the general import
of such an idea? And yet what a narrow interpretation the funda-
mental principle just quoted bears in the mind of the author of the
Novum organonl
The history of science has for several centuries endorsed the
notion that the expansion of the human horizon must proceed from
the inductive method, and in certain unprogressive domains it is
even to-day looking for decisive results from the application of this
truth. Yet the method in which Bacon thought he had pointed out
the way and the means for the increase of knowledge has only a
very remote and superficial similarity to the inductive method from
which the results of modern science are derived.
The "New Organon," as its title indicates, was to accomplish
what men had striven in vain for a number of centuries to attain
by the aid of the old organon, i. e., the logical writings of Aristotle.
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An instrument of knowledge was to be constructed which would bear
better fruit than the conceptual fabric of the scholastics and their
ancient masters which revolved in a circle and was despised by all
the world. The barren syllogistic of Aristotle was to give place to
systematic methods in which experimental research would have to
proceed. This in itself was a great task—so great that to the pres-
ent time only a very small part can be regarded as settled. But the
solution Bacon originated is coming more and more to be definitely
recognized as a mistake which soon could no longer count as any-
thing positive.
Nevertheless in the face of these facts which we regard as
undoubted indications of error and inadequacy, we must be just to
the merits of Bacon's works which lie in a different direction.
Wherever the actually deplorable condition of learning and the
causes by which the attainment of positive knowledge is hindered
are to be described, there Francis Bacon has found his proper
place. The feeling of the impotence of previous scholarship and
of the consequent human degradation was so strong and vivid in
him that it lent a great charm to his presentation of the idola which
hinder progress. He took this stand in the first parts of the
Novum organon as directed against a vast number of prejudices
and customs among which the errors of learning are also suitably
treated. Pedantry is condemned with fine scorn, and the single
expression "professional habit" {mos professorius) means at least
as much in the mouth of the man of the world or of business as the
pertinent characterization of idola, especially the so-called shadow
pictures of the cave (idolon specus sive cavernae).~ By the latter
very obvious expression Bacon sums up in this case all the individual
limitations originating partly from submersion in the narrowness
of an isolated vocational life hemmed in by an ignorant tradition.
Different classes of idols are here displayed, and the theory
of these illusive forces and these idols whose cult hinders the
progress of true science is well worth reading and taking to heart
to-day. Likewise where Bacon turns upon the prevalent meta-
physics, the daring of his conceptions deserves our sympathy even
to-day whenever he points prophetically to the vain and futile sys-
tems which would be proposed in the remotest future. The peru-
sal of the brief portion of the Novum organon devoted to general
conceptions might still serve in certain quarters as means towards
intellectual liberation. Just because we are separated from the
author by several centuries, the stimulating effect of his general
^ Compare Plato's Republic, VII.—Ed.
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descriptions is often all the greater. In these characteristics there
lies something of the restless impulse which is manifest in our own
century.
In Bacon's eyes printing, gunpowder and the mariner's com-
pass had already pointed the way to goals of modern power and
greatness. He would have naught to do with those dry controver-
sies which bore no fruit for human mastery over things but only
for the position and purse of the professors. For this reason he
rejected the syllogistics of Aristotle as totally barren, and opposed
authority in general, which is wrongly conceded to the traditions
of antiquity. On the river of time it is likewise the lesser weight
which floats on top of the water, and so it is exactly the lighter and
less valuable material which has been washed up while the heavier
and more significant has gone to the bottom. The works of an
Aristotle are preserved, while those of a Democritus and Empedo-
cles and others who were occupied with the true knowledge of
nature have been lost. The great significance which is generally
attributed to the accomplishments of the past is one of the chief
reasons for the impotence of the present.
Lord Bacon conceived the idea of a reformation of science
as a whole, and in later years he liked to regard it as "a strange
sort of fate" that although he "had labored for the sciences more
than for all else, yet he had been torn away to business matters and
a public life."
A certain encyclopedic current in those times need not surprise
us. In the comparatively narrow limits of the science of those days
universal combinations of the whole domain do not yet appear as
unsolvable tasks. Therefore we need not wonder that the possessor
of that proud consciousness of his own calling devoted the work
of the Instanratio magna not only to present the actual condition
of knowledge in all quarters but also actually to blaze a new path
and to show not only the method recommended but also its results.
The complete work, of which the Novum organon is only one
part, has remained, it is true, without a conclusion. Even the title of
the main part which appeared first, "On the Dignity and Enhancement
of the Sciences" (De dignitate et augmentis scicntiarnm) is char-
acteristic. Nevertheless the Novum organon, which follows as the
methodological basis, must be looked upon as the work properly
representing Bacon's philosophy. It is not the universal scholar
and his encyclopedic efifort that we are interested in, but the method-
izer and the impulses towards empiricism that he originated.
As previously indicated, Bacon's epistemology is of far greater
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negative than positive significance. He formulates correctly the
contrast between the Aristotelian method and the requirements of
a genuine increase of knowledge. In this connection he gives ex-
pression strikingly and drastically to what the approach of the
modern era had made perceptible before his time in the most
diverse quarters and to what Telesius Cosenza (1508-1588), for in-
stance, whom Bacon valued highly, had really represented.
Nevertheless his struggle against Aristotelian logic does not agree
entirely with the general conflict in which at that time the pro-
gressive party of the scholars and philosophers engaged against the
validity of that authority. Bacon directed his attention with good
effect against the two chief failings of the Stagirite. He explained
as unavailing the syllogistic connection of thoughts on the one hand,
and on the other the explanation of nature by the introduction of
the concept of purpose. The kind of observation which took pleas-
ure in searching after the purposes and intentions of nature's opera-
tions he compared to a divinely consecrated virgin who does not
give birth to a child. However, he thought that what is met with
in Aristotle as so-called induction is not at all rational as true induc-
tion ; that it refers only to the enumeration of cases and therefore
may be found in the crudest beginnings.
The positive part of the Novum organon presents the several
ways in which according to Bacon's idea research must be reformed
in order to obtain results scientifically. And yet his enumeration
of a large number of possible situations and applications of analytical
thought is itself neither methodic nor adequate. The cases for and
against the combination of two properties or phenomena are for
instance to be brought together in order to be able to pronounce
judgment for or against the affinity (e. g., of light and warmth)
according to the overwhelming accumulation of data. If one can
not deny that the wliole systematization is able to exert a stimu-
lating efifect in many directions yet the actual result is almost
nothing. The very thing that is most important in the strict science
of to-day is not even taken into consideration. That there can be
such a thing as an experiment possible only on the basis of genuine
speculation is not recognized in the least.
If we seek a reason for these errors we are confronted with
two possibilities. On the one hand there is e\en yet no separate
theory of inquiry in which authoritative schemata for the intellectual
function would be proposed in such a way as to be recognized by
naturalists as adequate and useful, and by logicians as rational and
systematic. On the other hand the assumption is most widespread
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among the positivists that such a theory of inquiry could not ac-
compHsh anything aside from the quite general ideas of observation
and experiment. It is not possible, they say with some reason, to
replace the practical foresight of the thinker and student once for
all by a collection of universal applications and formulas. Now
those who proceed from this hypothesis will find the errors of the
positive attempts of the Novum organon quite in order. They will
prophesy a like failure for the efiforts of every one who to-day
would undertake a similar task.
But now it will be urged against this that within strict science
itself—although in the garb of typical instances—scientific prin-
ciples and appHcations of the most general interpretation have been
laid down, and that it only requires a similar genius to create an
adequate and useful theory of inquiry upon the basis of these partly
concealed elements.
It is true that but few instances of this kind were at Bacon's
command, and, what is worse, these he could not utilize with his
type of mind and his knowledge. Since he had not the slightest
comprehension of the role and scope of mathematics in generating
knowledge he was compelled to remain behind even that which the
first Bacon three centuries before him had recognized as a scientific
necessity and had applied successfully. In this defect in mathemat-
ical and mechanical thought the man who presumed to point out
the paths of the future by his own method completely misunder-
stood the greatest attainments of the past. He ridiculed as a mani-
fest folly the Copernican system which had been made public a few
decades before his birth. He represented the falsest notions in
mechanics, and even ignored Archimedes's law of the lever at the
very time when the foundations of modern dynamics were being
laid by the almost contemporaneous Galilei.
But what Lord Bacon could not accomplish and what no one
will be able to do in the future who does not recognize positively
the significant part played by mathematical and quantitatively deter-
mined calculations and who does not regard them as a universally
authoritative principle, was the discovery of the true scientific prin-
ciples and the most efficient means of extending positive and fruit-
ful knowledge. He also lacked the slightest conception of that
kind of genuine naturalistic speculation which led a Galilei to rec-
ognize the law of falling bodies, and without which observations
and experiments would not be able to accomplish anything of im-
portance.
Just those anticipations which Bacon rejected are in a certain
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sense the first and most powerful means by which the understanding
penetrates the secrets of nature and marks out the direction in
which the decisive questions should be formulated, and wherever
possible to have them answered by nature itself by means of arti-
ficially arranged experiments. The best part of the theory must in
most cases be present before one succeeds in presupposing in a gen-
eral way facts of a determining kind. Now to be sure mathematical
thought is not the only source, though it is the most original source,
of all genuine anticipations. Whoever can not appreciate this basis
of a safe orientation must misunderstand still more every other
class of intrinsically authoritative forces of cognition. The under-
standing with its power to make a priori determinations must re-
main concealed from him and thus it is easy enough to explain
why the Novum organon failed in its positive task. Indeed this
explanation presupposes in the one for whom it is intended to have
any weight certain ideas of the content of strict science and of those
intellectual powers by which it has actually become great.
Our account of the causes which prevented Bacon from attain-
ing his main purpose even in the slightest respect is confirmed by
the recollection especially of the difference between him and the
genius of the same name who preceded him by three centuries in a
similar attempt.
Both Bacons took their point of departure from the utter
inaccessibility of what science there was and inadequacy of the pre-
valent methods. Both led discussions on the obstactles which hin-
dered more perfect knowledge. Both attempted a comprehensive
encyclopedia of the objects of knowledge but the first Bacon was
a positive thinker along mathematical lines who attained incon-
testable results. He was impelled by a genuine love of knowledge ;
vanity and ostentation were entirely foreign to him. The practical
results of this method can not be disputed. At least in optics and
particularly the theory of refraction he made decided progress. He
also discovered the combination of gunpowder itself, or at least of
something similar to it, as well as the application of such an ex-
plosive substance to the ejection of bodies from a tube. But we
can not bring up the slightest evidence in this direction with regard
to the second Bacon. He did not succeed in making a single dis-
covery, nor has a single application of his method elsewhere led him
to any attainment worth mentioning.
Then too if we compare the relative position which both occu-
pied to the centuries in which they lived and worked, there can not
be the slightest doubt to-day that that lonesome student of the
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thirteenth century far outshone the self-satisfied chancellor in this
point also. Even those, who, like Hallam, the English historian
and expert of the middle ages, value the second Bacon more highly
than he deserves have not a moment's hesitancy in recognizing
Roger Bacon as the first author of his century. Now no one to-day
would make the same claim for the second Bacon, and yet that
estimation of his predecessor is far below the truth.
Roger Bacon was not only in advance of his own century but
in the most important respect far beyond the entire middle ages,
and in some directions, as far as his type of mind is concerned,
he even stood on those heights which every era possesses, and on
which in all ages only geniuses of the first rank meet and under-
stand each other. Hence he shared in that which towers above the
middle level of every era and belongs to that region in which man-
kind as such, and not merely this or that generation, seeks nobler
and truer standards. Whatever pains we may take to praise the
scientific Lord Chancellor we shall not be able to win for him so
high a position. We must be satisfied if in the face of the nature
of his works, which we are now fortunate enough to be able to
study more closely, we may claim for him a certain power to stimu-
late to empirical methods. Even his assault upon the old methods
has a negative value, nor can we refuse him the credit of having
systematically and extensively classified and exposed certain ob-
stacles and absurdities of human knowledge. Yet in this respect
as well he may have been but the imitator of his predecessor. Still
the opinions of those who accuse him of directly borrowing from
the manuscripts of the first Bacon, and, as for instance Charles
Forster, have even printed parallel passages side by side, cannot
be considered here. It is known that others also have stolen from
Roger Bacon without giving him credit and have even honored him
by making literal excerpts. One such passage, for instance, made
a deep impression on Columbus and determined his decision with-
out the future discoverer of the new world knowing what genius
he had, so to speak, come into contact, and from what century
he had received confirmation of his views with regard to a western
passage.
Roger Bacon stands too high, and Francis Bacon is of compara-
tively too little significance for it not to be better to regard the loan
question in this case as pretty subordinate, and to save the time
which might be spent in exposing plagiarisms for really important
theories and considerations.
At any rate the second Bacon did not use his predecessor to the
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best advantage in the most important point, namely with respect
to mathematical and mechanical modes of thought and the corre-
sponding basis of the sciences. A skilful borrower who would have
taken up the matter from this side would evidently have made
himself more useful to the world than the second Bacon with his
Novum organon, the alleged instrument of science, in whose con-
struction unfortunately the finest instrument and most powerful
medium of knowledge which the human mind possesses remained
unconsidered. Nevertheless the Baron of Verulam would fain have
lifted the scientific world off its hinges without knowing the law of
the lever.
